9/11 attacks, all of the Central Asian states opened their doors to cooperation with USled efforts to combat Islamist extremists. There are several factors which have led to the current state of affairs in which the US is in the process of being expelled from its second and only remaining Central Asian base in the span of four years. First, US political and military engagement in Central Asia has frequently been disjointed and inconsistent. Second, the US has been unable to promote a coherent regional strategy, which looks holistically at the national interests of both the CAS themselves and other regional actors, of which Russia and China are the most important. Finally, expectations have been poorly managed so that CAS governments and societies have generally expected more material, financial and political benefits than the US has been able to or willing to provide, and the US has had equally unrealistic expectations concerning the pace of these states' reforms. civilian and military have proven unable to promote a coherent regional strategy, which looks holistically at the national interests of both the CAS themselves and other regional actors, of which Russia and China are the most important. Finally, expectations have been poorly managed so that CAS governments and societies have generally expected more material, financial and political benefits than the US has been able to or willing to provide, and the US has had equally unrealistic expectations concerning how quickly underdeveloped, poverty stricken, largely authoritarian states can transform themselves into modern, democratic, free market entities. Frequently, overworked US government actors have lost visibility of Central Asia as they grapple with the more pressing and immediate crises in Iraq, Afghanistan and the other hot spots we see referenced almost daily in the news headlines. During this period, as the US focused elsewhere, Russia, China, and other outside actors began to intensify their efforts to enhance their position in Central Asia, often in ways that undercut US objectives. These objectives include combating extremist groups that use terrorism against the US and its allies, fostering sovereign states with positive economic development and representative governments able to protect their borders and assist regional efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology and narcotics trafficking.
Accomplishing these objectives will also help to set conditions to achieve a stable and secure Afghanistan, an outcome upon which rests the reputation of the US and the NATO alliance. It is also in the US national interest to achieve these objectives without causing Russia and China to join together against us in the region, or to combine their efforts to challenge our interests elsewhere in the world. 1 The aim of this paper is to provide US strategic leaders with a number of policy recommendations that will best promote outcomes in the region favorable to both US national interests and the Central Asian States themselves, while minimizing the potential for a great power confrontation.
Background
Central Asia is, perhaps, the most misunderstood region in the world. The image many people have is clouded by the romance of the great Silk Road cities like Samarkand and Bukhara and the so-called Great Game, in which Russian and British soldiers, spies and explorers set out to expand their influence and control into this largely unknown region in order to gain a strategic advantage over their imperial rivals in the 19 th and early 20 th centuries. For Britain, these efforts had less to do with a desire to gain control of the region itself than it did with protecting its interests in India.
Imperial Russia, relentlessly expansionist, sought warm water ports, a southern security buffer, and perhaps eventual control over India, the crown jewel of the British Empire.
The buffer that developed became Afghanistan, an area in which neither empire was able to assert lasting control. The Muslim khanates to Afghanistan's north were incorporated, often bloodily, into the Russian empire and when that empire fell, they were brought forcibly into the Soviet Union. The allure of Central Asia for westerners deepened throughout the course of the 20th Century, as the Soviet government closed these republics to outsiders, locating secret and sensitive military installations across the forbidding deserts and mountains. 2 The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s endowed these countries with an independence they had not struggled for and which the Soviet educated elites did not want. 3 And certain intrepid westerners began to descend on the region, seeking riches and adventure. The treasure they lusted after was not gold or silk, but their modern equivalent -oil and gas. Talk spread of a "new Great Game" in which outside nations scrambled to secure access to these treasures and in which the needs, desires and aspirations of the vast majority of Central
Asians themselves appeared to matter little, if at all.
The newly independent Central Asian States found themselves victims of cruel geography. With no access to the world's waterways and surrounded by forbidding and dangerous lands, the region's struggle to make its way in the world was destined to be difficult. The rivers it did have, such as the fabled Oxus, 4 now desecrated by botched Soviet-era irrigation projects merely limped their way to a dying Aral Sea, itself transforming from a rich inland sea into a poisonous desert. Unlike the Persian Gulf, where oil tankers can practically berth next to the oil wells, Central Asian gas and oil must traverse expensive pipelines, hundreds or thousands of kilometers long in order to reach the global market. Development of the shortest routes, through the lawless regions of western Afghanistan and Pakistan, where central government control was tenuous or nonexistent, were precluded by instability and violence. 5 With no tradition of democracy and a civil society whose development had been stunted by the centrality of the Communist Party in almost every aspect of life, the Soviet era rulers remained in power. The resulting "republics" were ill equipped to tackle the daunting challenges of independence, and in most cases have struggled to maintain the status quo.
Common Factors
The Central Asian States are often lumped together along with such descriptors as "resource rich," which serves to obscure the uniqueness of each of the five countries.
To a certain degree this paper could be accused of falling into the same trap, as the regional focus logically leads to the need to employ generalities. That aside, one must not forget these five countries, while sharing many traits, are unique in many important ways. As a consequence, the general policy recommendations presented in this paper must be tailored to each country individually.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of Central Asia to an outsider whose Russian is the lingua franca of Central Asia, and is likely to remain so for some time to come, despite efforts to revive national languages. Another striking example of the enduring Soviet impact on the region is that in the decade and a half following independence, four of five presidents were holdovers from the Soviet period. 10 The sole exception was Emomali Rakhmon, a man with impeccable Soviet credentials backed by Russia during Tajikistan's civil war in the 1990's.
There has yet to be a peaceful transition of power in the region, except through the death of a national leader.
Perhaps the most glaring failure of Soviet social engineering is the enduring influence of clans in Central Asian politics and society. Clans remain the fundamental political units across the region, which has hampered the maturation of the political process and civil society in the region and kept central governments weak. 
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Given the short period of time these efforts have been underway, their prospects for success are not clear, nor is it known to what degree these civic identities will become entwined with cultural identities. Perhaps as a result of these cultural and political factors, there were never popular independence movements in the region during the waning days of the USSR when such movements were forming in other parts of the Soviet Union. At that time many Russians saw these republics as a burden, taking in more than they produced for the Soviet economy, and were thus not only willing, but in some cases eager to cast them loose. 14 The lack of a unifying myth for these modern states is another significant obstacle to the creation of cohesive national identities.
Another shared characteristic of the CAS is a legacy of environmental destruction and decayed infrastructure. The environmental concerns are particularly acute and affect all five countries, particularly with regard to water resources. The Soviet decision to promote domestic cotton production by cultivating a water-intensive crop in an arid region has had a profoundly negative impact throughout Central Asia, which is not easily reversed since many of the regional economies rely on cotton. In Uzbekistan, for example, cotton is the single largest component of the Gross Domestic Product, constituting roughly 14% of the national economy. 15 Due to the inefficiency and poor state of the irrigation system vast quantities of water are lost to seepage and evaporation. 16 Additionally, rising soil salinity brought about by poor agricultural practices increases the amount of water needed for irrigation from year to year.
Reaching an equitable regional solution is hampered by the fact that the two major rivers supplying the region cross and re-cross national boundaries and is further complicated by the diametrically opposed seasonal needs of upstream and downstream nations. 17 This situation, a result of Soviet boundary drawing and the creation of a unified water distribution system that was never envisaged to serve the needs of multiple independent states, means that only a regional approach will be successful in solving this pressing issue. Unfortunately, the CAS have tended to act in ways that promote their narrow national interests at the expense of their neighbors. 18 One of the primary motivations for outside interest in Central Asia has been the widespread perception that the region holds vast, untapped oil and gas reserves. While true to some extent, some perspective is in order. Only three of five CAS possess significant petroleum assets: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. With no direct access to the world's oceans, accessing these reserves is extremely costly, requiring the construction of pipelines. Political instability to the south has prevented the construction of transport in that direction, as investors and businessmen shy from making such significant investments in either Afghanistan or Iran. The only functioning routes for Central Asian gas and oil to exit the region goes through Russia, which has allowed that country to negotiate transit fees on very favorable terms. The Baku-TblisiCeyhan (BTC) pipeline is the single transit possibility for oil from the Caspian basin to reach world markets, but only Azerbaijan, on the west bank of the Caspian Sea and not a Central Asian state, is currently able to take advantage of this alternate route. A Chinese initiative to construct a pipeline across Kazakhstan is underway, but the huge cost involved makes this project uneconomical and it therefore must be seen as a move by China to improve its energy security. Finally, it should be noted that the Caspian resources are more akin to those of the North Sea in scale than to the Persian Gulf.
Full exploitation of these resources, especially if the Russian transit monopoly were to be broken, would almost certainly have the effect of pushing oil and gas prices down somewhat, but likely not enough to fundamentally change the global energy market.
From Central Asia's perspective, the main benefit of multiple energy transit routes would be to give them greater economic, and thus political, independence from Moscow. 19 The other critical resource in Central Asia is water. Used for hydropower, agriculture and to sustain the lives of desert dwellers throughout the region, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, Central Asia's poorest countries, also possess the lion's share of its water. As is the case in many other parts of the world, division of water resources is a contentious issue and has been a constant irritant in interstate relations since the Soviet collapse.
In addition to the ecological challenges described above, the CAS face a number of common regional issues such as terrorism, extremism and the corrosive effects of corruption fueled by the transit of illicit drugs from Afghanistan. Indigenous attempts to find regional solutions have been hampered by interstate rivalries and mistrust. In particular this distrust has been directed toward Uzbekistan, which aside from having the largest population and military in the region occupies the central geographic position and has frequently sent security forces into its neighbors' territory without permission from those governments. Regional mistrust, combined with porous borders, authoritarian governments, and generally weak security institutions makes the area vulnerable to many of globalization's ills such as drugs, human trafficking, terrorist operations and the spread of political extremism.
The Outside Powers
Without a doubt, Russia is the most important outside player in Central Asia due to its cultural, linguistic, economic, and security ties, much of which are a consequence of a shared Soviet and Russian Imperial heritage. In the Putin era, Russia has become increasingly explicit in expressing its desire to maintain a dominant position in the foreign policies of the countries in what it calls the "near abroad." 20 This region roughly corresponds to the outline of the old Soviet Union and the late Russian Empire before it.
In the Putin era, Russia has become more aggressive in its willingness to enforce its will in the "near abroad" both by military means, as in the case of its invasion of Georgia in Russia's perception of this region is complex and in some cases contradictory.
Central Asians and their region are often seen by Russians as a source of terrorism, Islamic extremism, narcotics and other ills. 22 But reasserting national greatness, as the current regime seems bent on doing, is leading Russia to shore up and/or reestablish a sphere of influence, starting with those countries that belonged to Moscow's old empires. Central Asia, due to its geographic position far from Europe, has fewer options for finding geostrategic partners than those former-Soviet countries on Europe's fringes -Ukraine and Moldova for example, and is therefore a prime target for this sort of attention. As the Soviet Union collapsed, Russians were more than happy to cast off Central Asia, which many Russians viewed as a burden rather than an asset. Chinese objectives in Central Asia appear to focus on three areas. The first is securing access to resources, especially energy. The second area is in preventing Uighur separatist groups from using weakly governed Central Asian states, particularly the Kyrgyz republic which has its own small Uighur minority as safe havens. The
Chinese characterize these groups as "terrorists" and while there do appear to be links between Al Qaeda and some in the Uighur population, it is probable that China exaggerates these connections in order to legitimize its own anti-Uighur activities. 25 The third area is limiting US presence in Central Asia, an interest it shares with Russia and which appears to have served as a foundation for cooperation in recent years.
Both China and Russia are bordered by strong US allies. Russia's western frontier is being brought ever closer to an expanding NATO alliance, while China's eastern border faces Japan, South Korea and other US allies and security partners in the Pacific. It is perhaps understandable if both Russia and China see a growth in US presence in Central Asia as an effort to encircle them. This is probably why a regional organization known as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a six nation body whose members are China, Russia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan has continued to grow in both influence and capabilities since its inception in 1996. While Russia's and China's aims in Central Asia, particularly concerning access to energy, may not be in concert, both seem to agree on cooperation to limit US and NATO presence. The SCO's stated aims are to tackle the same sorts of transnational issues as the US, EU and NATO programs -combating terrorism and drug trafficking, promoting economic development, etc. It should also be remarked, that while Russia and China may be promoting the SCO as a tool for reducing Western influence, it also provides both countries with a mechanism for keeping tabs on each other. 
Central Asia as Geostrategic Intersection
One might ask whether there is indeed any pressing justification for the US to play a major role in Central Asia. From a realpolitik perspective, such a role seems difficult to justify as the potential to create additional hazards to national security may outweigh the positive effects. Brzezinsky, for example has proposed a geostrategic model in which the post Cold War world can be thought of as two "Eurasian power triangles." The first consists of the US, Russia and Europe and the second consists of the US, China and Japan. He asserts that managing these triangles is critical to ensuring US security at the beginning of the 21 st Century. 32 These two areas, which might also be characterized as Atlantic and Pacific security spheres, are generally thought of as two separate problems, in which only the US is concerned with both. Like all such models, this one represents a simplified version of reality, useful for seeing the big picture, but lacking granularity when applied to specific situations. Nonetheless, it is obvious that Central Asia sits at the intersection of Brzezkinski's two triangles, and is a geographic sphere in which Russia, China and the US are simultaneously working to expand their access and influence. Any US efforts in the region should be weighed against the effects these efforts will have on both of these great powers. As mentioned earlier, if our actions provoke combined Russian and Chinese efforts against America, an outcome which US foreign policy has been trying to avoid for nearly four decades, or worse yet, the formation of a Russia-China bloc, this would seriously degrade our national security, and not just in Central Asia.
In addition to realpolitik, useful insights into the region and its position in relation to the outside powers can also be gleaned from applying the cultural model proposed by In explaining this, another concept introduced by Huntington, the torn country, may prove useful. 33 According to Huntington, a torn country "has a single predominant culture which places it in one civilization but its leaders want to shift it to another civilization." 34 Furthermore, the principle of sovereignty must be upheld lest outside actors use coercion in order to thwart the decisions of the representative governments that we would hope to midwife. As Vice-President, Joseph Biden said in his first major foreign policy address after taking office. "It will remain our view that sovereign states have the right to make their own decisions and choose their own alliances." 36 Despite the somewhat nebulous nature of the aforementioned interests, work in these areas will also serve to mitigate a number of concrete threats to America's security: terrorism, narcotrafficking and energy security. Regional instability resulting from failed or failing states or interstate conflict will adversely impact both our ideological interests as well as the more concrete security threats. Finally, and perhaps of greatest concern to us in 2009, success of US and NATO efforts in Afghanistan, upon which to a certain degree rests our reputation as an effective and responsible global actor, will be greatly influenced by developments in that country's northern neighbors, both for good and ill.
In the past 4-5 years, the US has lost ground to both Russia and China in Central Asia. As I have argued previously, a significant Russian position in the region is probably unavoidable and attempts by the US to play a greater role should be weighed against our national interests in the region. These interests are limited and, in many cases coincide with those of our rivals, especially when it comes to ensuring Central
Asian governments are capable of securing their borders as well as providing their own internal security. The US, Russia, China, as well as Europe and others,, are all threatened by the spread of extremism, terrorism, illicit narcotics and interstate conflict with its potential to adversely impact energy exports. The major players' interests are in discord in two primary areas. The first is how access to energy resources is to be configured. Russia would like to retain exclusive access to these resources, while
China seeks its own direct access. The US would like expanded and diversified access to bring Caspian oil and gas to world market, leaving regional states with options that do not leave them at the mercy of any single state and calculating that increased availability of these resources on the global market will have a positive effect on oil and gas prices. The second item of discord is the desired direction of political developments in the region. Russia would benefit from relatively authoritarian Central Asian governments with explicitly pro-Russian orientations, which can be easily manipulated to serve Russian interests. The authoritarian regime in China would also be threatened by the growth of democratic governments on its western flank, particularly as this development could adversely impact its efforts to displace the Uighur minority in Xinjiang. Insofar as democratic governments would likely be friendlier to the US and Western Europe, both Russia and China may view democratization efforts as a shared threat.
While specific policies must change and evolve with developments, there are a number of general principles that if appropriately applied could serve to increase the effectiveness of US foreign policy in Central Asia. The first of these is to adopt a more regional approach. This applies both to how the US engages these countries, as well as how the CAS should approach the significant challenges they face in the areas of security, economics and the environment. The US can continue to promote regional cooperation in areas such as information sharing and combined efforts to combat terrorism, narco-trafficking, trafficking in human beings and other law enforcement efforts. Assisting with indigenous efforts, when consistent with US interests and values is less likely to be viewed as interference, a charge to which Washington is already vulnerable. Indeed, solving critical problems such as the dilapidated water distribution system will only be possible through multilateral dialogue and regional institutions that balance the needs of all countries and adopt a collective approach to critical infrastructure repairs and improvements. Extra effort must also be applied to harmonize US government efforts into a single, coherent policy. Both political and military objectives and interests should be appropriately balanced and applied with greater consistency than in recent years. The unintentionally bifurcated US approach has put America at a disadvantage in the competition for influence and access in Central Asia.
Many actors both within the region and externally will be suspicious of US motives in Central Asia, however well intentioned these efforts are. The best antidote to this is a transparent approach that seeks cooperation with Russia and China when possible. Realistically, building a high level of trust with Russia and China is probably not achievable in the near future -diverging geostrategic goals will almost certainly make this impossible. There is room, however, for limited cooperation in the areas of common national interest outlined earlier. The US should consider reaching out to regional organizations, primarily the SCO and CSTO. While such overtures are likely to be rejected initially 37 , over time both organizations will risk exposing themselves to criticism that they are, as suggested earlier in this paper, tools to isolate Central Asia from the West. Transparency, particularly if US efforts remain focused on areas that benefit Central Asians can become a potent strategic communications asset over time.
Western actors engaging the SCO and CSTO must, however, be wary lest these instruments are used to hamper true bilateral engagement by inserting Russian or
Chinese influenced intermediaries between them and the Central Asian societies and governments.
Consistent with our values and national interest in maintaining the global order, the US must continue to support democratization and efforts toward economic modernization and reform throughout Central Asia, even where these objectives are met with resistance from internal and external actors. Americans must be patient and resist the urge to fix every problem immediately. A slow, steady and deliberate approach that takes the long view will be more productive than the short, intense bursts of interest, followed by periods of neglect and disinterest which have too often characterized US efforts in the region. Managing expectations on both sides will be a critical element to improving relations, as the US may have set the bar for human rights and democratization too high too quickly, while failing to provide the economic and military aid CAS regimes felt was their due for supporting the US in the War on
Terror. Insofar as possible, the US must work to protect the sovereignty of the CAS and preserve their ability to be independent actors, free to chose political and economic arrangements that best serve their own national interests. While most of these governments, with the possible exceptions of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, are moving closer to Russia, all of them nonetheless want to preserve their independence. It is in our interest to see these states do not become vassals of the powers around them.
Just as the Russian invasion of Georgia has affected the political dynamic in Central
Asia, events in the CAS will influence developments in the Caucasus and Eastern
Europe -both for good and ill.
Finally, the single biggest failing for US foreign policy in Central Asia has been an apparent unwillingness or inability to understand the points of view of both the governments and people. When we ask the small, weak Kyrgyz Republic to host a US military airbase in defiance of two very large and powerful neighbors, we must offer more than a few million dollars in security assistance and rent for facilities. To expect a positive outcome for retaining this base in the face of Russian and Chinese opposition is to expect the Kyrgyz Republic to make an irrational decision, willingly placing itself in the position of Melos facing not one, but two Athens. We must consider that Central
Asian calculations of national interest were doubtless affected by the Russian invasion of Georgia, which starkly demonstrated the perils of relying on US friendship and goodwill as a basis for national security. Therefore, US cooperation efforts in the region must be undertaken so as to improve the overall geopolitical position of our Central Asian partners, even if that means taking Russian and Chinese objectives into consideration. And success in Afghanistan is critical to the national security of both countries, even if they are loath to admit it. If we attempt to force Central Asian governments to choose between the US on the one hand and Russia and China on the other, we will lose. The best strategic outcome for Central Asia and the US is likely to be achieved not by forcing the CAS to choose between suitors, but by enabling them to continue to balance the interests of all of the outside powers.
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